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# SMART CONTRACT

**Security Audit Report** 

Project: Mobland

Website: <a href="https://mob.land">https://mob.land</a>

Platform: Binance Smart Chain

Language: Solidity

Date: February 6th, 2023

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## Introduction

EtherAuthority was contracted by Mobland to perform the Security audit of the Mobland Protocol smart contracts code. The audit has been performed using manual analysis as well as using automated software tools. This report presents all the findings regarding the audit performed on February 6th, 2023.

#### The purpose of this audit was to address the following:

- Ensure that all claimed functions exist and function correctly.
- Identify any security vulnerabilities that may be present in the smart contract.

## **Project Background**

- MOBLAND is introducing a revolutionary NFT borrow and lending marketplace set to disrupt the way players transact within and beyond the game.
- The Shadow Market gives the Turf & Farm Owners the unique ability to earn by renting out (lending) their assets within the MOBLAND ecosystem.
- The Shadow Market will allow players to Lend/Borrow Turfs & Farms, Consume SEED, Grow BUD & Upgrade Farms.
- The in-game Shadow Market is utilized to borrow and/or lend in-game assets.
   Owners (Lenders) have the freedom to set lending parameters and list assets on the marketplace where Renters (Borrowers) can efficiently search the marketplace to borrow assets.
- Mobland Contracts have functions like mint, burn, lock, unlock, mintMany, mintBatch, Buy an NFT, etc.
- Mobland The contract inherits the ERC20. AddressUpgradeable, SafeMathUpgradeable, ERC721Upgradeable, ERC721EnumerableUpgradeable, AddressUpgradeable, ERC1155, Ownable, Address. ERC721, Pausable. StringsUpgradeable, OwnableUpgradeable, IERC165Upgradeable, IERC721Upgradeable, ERC165 standard smart contracts from the OpenZeppelin library.
- These OpenZeppelin contracts are considered community-audited and time-tested, and hence are not part of the audit scope.

# **Audit scope**

Name	Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Mobland Protocol Smart Contracts
Platform	BSC / Solidity
File 1	NftFactory.sol
File 2	<u>SuperpowerNFT.sol</u>
File 3	SuperpowerNFTBase.sol
File 4	WhitelistSlot.sol
File 5	<u>Farm.sol</u>
File 6	<u>FarmBridged.sol</u>
File 7	<u>Turf.sol</u>
File 8	<u>TurfBridged.sol</u>
File 9	WormholeCommon.sol
File 10	Wormhole721.sol
File 11	WormholeTunnel.sol
File 12	<u>GamePool.sol</u>
File 13	<u>Signable.sol</u>
File 14	<u>SignableStakes.sol</u>
File 15	<u>SideToken.sol</u>
File 16	BudToken.sol
File 17	<u>SeedToken.sol</u>
Audit Date	February 6th,2023
Revision Date	February 8th, 2023

# **Claimed Smart Contract Features**


Claimed Feature Detail	Our Observation
<ul> <li>File 1 NftFactory.sol</li> <li>Owner can set a whitelist address.</li> <li>Owner can Withdraw proceeds.</li> <li>Owner can update the prices of an existing running Sale.</li> <li>Owner can create a new Sale for an NFT and update an existing Sale.</li> </ul>	YES, This is valid.
File 2 SuperpowerNFT.sol  Owner can set the maximum supply.  Owner can mint tokens.	YES, This is valid.
<ul> <li>File 3 SuperpowerNFTBase.sol</li> <li>Owner can set the game address.</li> <li>Owner can set the locker address and remove the locker address.</li> <li>Owner can freeze the token URI.</li> </ul>	YES, This is valid.
File 4 WhitelistSlot.sol  • Owner can set a new URI.	YES, This is valid.
File 5 Farm.sol  Name: MOBLAND Farm Symbol: mFARM	YES, This is valid.
File 6 FarmBridged.sol  Name: MOBLAND Farm Symbol: mFARM	YES, This is valid.
File 7 Turf.sol  Name: MOBLAND Turf Symbol: mTURF	YES, This is valid.

File 8 TurfBridged.sol  Name: MOBLAND Turf Symbol: mTURF	YES, This is valid.
WormholeCommon.sol     WormholeCommon can check if the transfer is Completed or not.	YES, This is valid.
File 10 WormholeTunnel.sol     Owner can set wormhole register contract address	YES, This is valid.
File 11 Wormhole721.sol  • Complete a transfer from Wormhole.	YES, This is valid.
<ul> <li>File 12 GamePool.sol</li> <li>The Owner can withdraw an amount of funds in SEEDS or BUDS, or all of them if the amount is 0.</li> <li>The Owner can initialize the attributes of a turf token and farm token.</li> </ul>	YES, This is valid.
File 13 Signable.sol  • The Owner can set a signable address.	YES, This is valid.
File 14 SignableStakes.sol  SignableStakes contract can check hash unstake.	YES, This is valid.
<ul> <li>File 15 SideToken.sol</li> <li>Minter can mint amounts.</li> <li>The Owner can set a minter address.</li> </ul>	YES, This is valid.

File 16 BudToken.sol	
Name: Mobland Bud Token	
Symbol: BUD	YES, This is valid.
Decimals: 18	
Version: 1	
File 17 SeedToken.sol	YES, This is valid.
Name: Mobland Seed Token	
Symbol: SEED	
Decimals: 18	
Version: 1	

## **Audit Summary**

According to the standard audit assessment, Customer's solidity smart contracts are "Secured". Also, these contracts do contain owner control, which does not make them fully decentralized.



We used various tools like Slither, Solhint and Remix IDE. At the same time this finding is based on critical analysis of the manual audit.

All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed and applicable vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit overview section. General overview is presented in AS-IS section and all identified issues can be found in the Audit overview section.

We found 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium and 2 low and some very low level issues.

All issues have been fixed / acknowledged in the revised code.

**Investors Advice:** Technical audit of the smart contract does not guarantee the ethical nature of the project. Any owner controlled functions should be executed by the owner with responsibility. All investors/users are advised to do their due diligence before investing in the project.

# **Technical Quick Stats**

Main Category	Subcategory	Result
Contract	Solidity version not specified	Passed
Programming	Solidity version too old	Passed
	Integer overflow/underflow	Passed
	Function input parameters lack of check	Passed
	Function input parameters check bypass	Passed
	Function access control lacks management	Passed
	Critical operation lacks event log	Moderated
	Human/contract checks bypass	Passed
	Random number generation/use vulnerability	N/A
	Fallback function misuse	Passed
	Race condition	Passed
	Logical vulnerability	Passed
	Features claimed	Passed
	Other programming issues	Passed
Code	Function visibility not explicitly declared	Passed
Specification	Var. storage location not explicitly declared	Passed
	Use keywords/functions to be deprecated	Passed
	Unused code	Passed
Gas Optimization	"Out of Gas" Issue	Passed
	High consumption 'for/while' loop	Moderated
	High consumption 'storage' storage	Passed
	Assert() misuse	Passed
Business Risk	Business Risk The maximum limit for mintage not set	
	"Short Address" Attack	Passed
	"Double Spend" Attack	Passed

**Overall Audit Result: PASSED** 

**Code Quality** 

This audit scope has 17 smart contract files. Smart contracts contain Libraries, Smart

contracts, inherits and Interfaces. This is a compact and well written smart contract.

The libraries in the Mobland Protocol are part of its logical algorithm. A library is a different

type of smart contract that contains reusable code. Once deployed on the blockchain (only

once), it is assigned a specific address and its properties / methods can be reused many

times by other contracts in the Mobland Protocol.

The Mobland team has provided unit test scripts, which have helped to determine the

integrity of the code in an automated way.

Code parts are **not well** commented on smart contracts.

**Documentation** 

We were given a Mobland Protocol smart contract code in the form of a github link. The

links of that code are mentioned above in the table.

As mentioned above, code parts are **not well** commented. But the logic is straightforward.

So it is easy to quickly understand the programming flow as well as complex code logic.

Comments are very helpful in understanding the overall architecture of the protocol.

Another source of information was its official website <a href="https://mob.land">https://mob.land</a> which provided rich

information about the project architecture and tokenomics.

**Use of Dependencies** 

As per our observation, the libraries are used in this smart contracts infrastructure that are

based on well known industry standard open source projects.

Apart from libraries, its functions are used in external smart contract calls.

## **AS-IS** overview

# **NftFactory.sol**

#### **Functions**

SI.	Functions	Туре	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	initialize	write	Passed	No Issue
3	setWl	external	access only Owner	No Issue
4	setPaymentToken	external	access only Owner	No Issue
5	setNewNft	external	access only Owner	No Issue
6	removeNewNft	external	access only Owner	No Issue
7	getNftIdByAddress	external	Passed	No Issue
8	getNftAddressByld	external	Passed	No Issue
9	getPaymentTokenSymbol	external	Passed	No Issue
10	newSale	external	Infinite loops	Refer Audit
			possibility	Findings
11	updateSale	external	access only Owner	No Issue
12	endSale	external	access only Owner	No Issue
13	updatePrice	external	access only Owner	No Issue
14	getSale	external	Passed	No Issue
15	getPrice	read	Passed	No Issue
16	getWIPrice	read	Passed	No Issue
17	buyTokens	external	Passed	No Issue
18	withdrawProceeds	write	access only Owner	No Issue

## SuperpowerNFT.sol

SI.	Functions	Type	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	onlyFactory	modifier	Passed	No Issue
3	canMint	modifier	Passed	No Issue
4	setDefaultPlayer	external	access only Owner	No Issue
5	setMaxSupply	external	access only Owner	No Issue
6	setFactory	external	access only Owner	No Issue
7	isFactory	read	Passed	No Issue
8	hasFactories	read	Passed	No Issue
9	canMintAmount	read	Passed	No Issue
10	mint	write	access only Factory	No Issue
11	endMinting	external	access only Owner	No Issue
12	mintEnded	external	Passed	No Issue
13	maxSupply	external	Passed	No Issue
14	nextTokenId	external	Passed	No Issue

# SuperpowerNFTBase.sol

#### **Functions**

SI.	Functions	Туре	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	onlyLocker	modifier	Passed	No Issue
3	onlyGame	modifier	Passed	No Issue
4	tokenExists	modifier	Passed	No Issue
5	SuperpowerNFTBase_	internal	initializer	No Issue
<u> </u>	init		December	NI. I
6	_beforeTokenTransfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
7	preInitializeAttributesFor	external	access only Owner	No Issue
8	attributesOf	external	Passed	No Issue
9	initializeAttributesFor	external	Passed	No Issue
10	updateAttributes	external	Passed	No Issue
11	supportsInterface	read	Passed	No Issue
12	_baseURI	internal	Passed	No Issue
13	updateTokenURI	external	access only Owner	No Issue
14	freezeTokenURI	external	access only Owner	No Issue
15	contractURI	read	Passed	No Issue
16	setGame	external	access only Owner	No Issue
17	locked	read	Passed	No Issue
18	lockerOf	external	Passed	No Issue
19	isLocker	read	Passed	No Issue
20	setLocker	external	Locker contract not set	No Issue
21	removeLocker	external	access only Owner	No Issue
22	hasLocks	read	Passed	No Issue
23	lock	external	access only Locker	No Issue
24	unlock	external	access only Locker	No Issue
25	unlocklfRemovedLocker	external	access only Owner	No Issue
26	approve	write	Passed	No Issue
27	getApproved	read	Passed	No Issue
28	setApprovalForAll	write	Passed	No Issue
29	isApprovedForAll	read	Passed	No Issue
30	wormholeTransfer	write	Passed	No Issue

## WhitelistSlot.sol

SI.	Functions	Type	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	setURI	write	access only Owner	No Issue
3	setBurner	write	access only Owner	No Issue
4	mintBatch	write	access only Owner	No Issue

5	mintMany	write	Infinite loops	Refer Audit
			possibility	Findings
6	burn	write	Passed	No Issue

## Farm.sol

#### **Functions**

SI.	Functions	Туре	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	onlyFactory	modifier	Passed	No Issue
3	canMint	modifier	Passed	No Issue
4	setDefaultPlayer	external	access only Owner	No Issue
5	setMaxSupply	external	access only Owner	No Issue
6	setFactory	external	access only Owner	No Issue
7	isFactory	read	Passed	No Issue
8	hasFactories	read	Passed	No Issue
9	canMintAmount	read	Passed	No Issue
10	mint	write	access only Factory	No Issue
11	endMinting	external	access only Owner	No Issue
12	mintEnded	external	Passed	No Issue
13	maxSupply	external	Passed	No Issue
14	nextTokenId	external	Passed	No Issue

# FarmBridged.sol

SI.	Functions	Type	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	onlyLocker	modifier	Passed	No Issue
3	onlyGame	modifier	Passed	No Issue
4	tokenExists	modifier	Passed	No Issue
5	SuperpowerNFTBase_	internal	initializer	No Issue
	init			
6	_beforeTokenTransfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
7	preInitializeAttributesFor	external	access only Owner	No Issue
8	attributesOf	external	Passed	No Issue
9	initializeAttributesFor	external	Passed	No Issue
10	updateAttributes	external	Passed	No Issue
11	supportsInterface	read	Passed	No Issue
12	_baseURI	internal	Passed	No Issue
13	updateTokenURI	external	access only Owner	No Issue
14	freezeTokenURI	external	access only Owner	No Issue
15	contractURI	read	Passed	No Issue
16	setGame	external	access only Owner	No Issue
17	locked	read	Passed	No Issue

18	lockerOf	external	Passed	No Issue
19	isLocker	read	Passed	No Issue
20	setLocker	external	access only Owner	No Issue
21	removeLocker	external	access only Owner	No Issue
22	hasLocks	read	Passed	No Issue
23	lock	external	access only Locker	No Issue
24	unlock	external	access only Locker	No Issue
25	unlocklfRemovedLocker	external	access only Owner	No Issue
26	approve	write	Passed	No Issue
27	getApproved	read	Passed	No Issue
28	setApprovalForAll	write	Passed	No Issue
29	isApprovedForAll	read	Passed	No Issue
30	wormholeTransfer	write	Passed	No Issue

## Turf.sol

#### **Functions**

SI.	Functions	Туре	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	onlyFactory	modifier	Passed	No Issue
3	canMint	modifier	Passed	No Issue
4	setDefaultPlayer	external	access only Owner	No Issue
5	setMaxSupply	external	access only Owner	No Issue
6	setFactory	external	access only Owner	No Issue
7	isFactory	read	Passed	No Issue
8	hasFactories	read	Passed	No Issue
9	canMintAmount	read	Passed	No Issue
10	mint	write	access only Factory	No Issue
11	endMinting	external	access only Owner	No Issue
12	mintEnded	external	Passed	No Issue
13	maxSupply	external	Passed	No Issue
14	nextTokenId	external	Passed	No Issue

# TurfBridged.sol

SI.	Functions	Type	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	onlyLocker	modifier	Passed	No Issue
3	onlyGame	modifier	Passed	No Issue
4	tokenExists	modifier	Passed	No Issue
5	SuperpowerNFTBase_	internal	initializer	No Issue
	init			
6	beforeTokenTransfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
7	preInitializeAttributesFor	external	access only Owner	No Issue

8	attributesOf	external	Passed	No Issue
9	initializeAttributesFor	external	Passed	No Issue
10	updateAttributes	external	Passed	No Issue
11	supportsInterface	read	Passed	No Issue
12	_baseURI	internal	Passed	No Issue
13	updateTokenURI	external	access only Owner	No Issue
14	freezeTokenURI	external	access only Owner	No Issue
15	contractURI	read	Passed	No Issue
16	setGame	external	access only Owner	No Issue
17	locked	read	Passed	No Issue
18	lockerOf	external	Passed	No Issue
19	isLocker	read	Passed	No Issue
20	setLocker	external	access only Owner	No Issue
21	removeLocker	external	access only Owner	No Issue
22	hasLocks	read	Passed	No Issue
23	lock	external	access only Locker	No Issue
24	unlock	external	access only Locker	No Issue
25	unlocklfRemovedLocker	external	access only Owner	No Issue
26	approve	write	Passed	No Issue
27	getApproved	read	Passed	No Issue
28	setApprovalForAll	write	Passed	No Issue
29	isApprovedForAll	read	Passed	No Issue
30	wormholeTransfer	write	Passed	No Issue

## Wormhole721.sol

#### **Functions**

SI.	Functions	Туре	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	supportsInterface	read	Passed	No Issue
3	wormholeTransfer	write	Passed	No Issue
4	wormholeCompleteTransfer	write	Passed	No Issue

## WormholeCommon.sol

#### **Functions**

SI.	Functions	Type	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	isTransferCompleted	read	Passed	No Issue
3	contractByChainId	read	Passed	No Issue
4	wormhole	read	Passed	No Issue
5	chainId	read	Passed	No Issue
6	_setWormhole	internal	Passed	No Issue
7	_setChainId	internal	Passed	No Issue
8	_setTransferCompleted	internal	Passed	No Issue

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9	_setContract	internal	Passed	No Issue
10	_wormholeCompleteTran	internal	Passed	No Issue
	sfer			
11	_wormholeTransferWithV	internal	Passed	No Issue
	alue			
12	_logTransfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
13	_verifyContractVM	internal	Passed	No Issue
14	encodeTransfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
15	_parseTransfer	internal	Passed	No Issue

## GamePool.sol

#### **Functions**

SI.	Functions	Type	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	_equalString	internal	Passed	No Issue
3	initialize	write	initializer	No Issue
4	setConf	external	access only Owner	No Issue
5	stakeAsset	external	Passed	No Issue
6	unstakeAsset	external	Passed	No Issue
7	_checkStakeState	internal	Passed	No Issue
8	getStakeIndexByTokenId	read	Passed	No Issue
9	getStakeByIndex	external	Passed	No Issue
10	getNumberOfStakes	external	Passed	No Issue
11	getUserDeposits	external	Passed	No Issue
12	getUserStakes	external	Passed	No Issue
13	_saveSignatureAsUsed	internal	Passed	No Issue
14	depositSeed	external	Passed	No Issue
15	depositBud	external	Passed	No Issue
16	depositSeedAndPayOther User	external	Passed	No Issue
17	_depositFT	internal	Passed	No Issue
18	depositByIndex	read	Passed	No Issue
19	numberOfDeposits	external	Passed	No Issue
20	depositById	external	Passed	No Issue
21	depositByldAndUser	external	Passed	No Issue
22	harvest	external	Passed	No Issue
23	withdrawFT	external	access only Owner	No Issue
24	initializeTurf	external	access only Owner	No Issue
25	updateTurfAttributes	external	Passed	No Issue
26	getTurfAttributes	external	Passed	No Issue
27	initializeFarm	external	access only Owner	No Issue
28	updateFarmAttributes	external	Passed	No Issue
29	getFarmAttributes	external	Passed	No Issue
30	attributesOf	external	Passed	No Issue
31	hashDeposit	read	Passed	No Issue
32	hashDepositAndPay	read	Passed	No Issue

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33	hashHarvesting	read	Passed	No Issue
34	hashFarmAttributes	read	Passed	No Issue
35	hashTurfAttributes	read	Passed	No Issue

# Signable.sol

#### **Functions**

SI.	Functions	Туре	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	Ownable_init	internal	access only Initializing	No Issue
3	Ownable_init_unchained	internal	initializer	No Issue
4	onlyOwner	modifier	Passed	No Issue
5	owner	read	Passed	No Issue
6	_checkOwner	internal	Passed	No Issue
7	renounceOwnership	write	access only Owner	No Issue
8	transferOwnership	write	access only Owner	No Issue
9	transferOwnership	internal	Passed	No Issue
10	Signable_init	internal	access only Owner	No Issue
11	setValidator	external	access only Owner	No Issue
12	getValidator	external	Passed	No Issue
13	isValidator	external	Passed	No Issue
14	isSignedByValidator	read	Passed	No Issue
15	isSignedByAValidator	read	Passed	No Issue

## SignableStakes.sol

## **Functions**

SI.	Functions	Туре	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	hashUnstake	read	Passed	No Issue
3	setValidator	external	access only Owner	No Issue
4	getValidator	external	Passed	No Issue
5	isValidator	external	Passed	No Issue
6	isSignedByValidator	read	Passed	No Issue
7	isSignedByAValidator	read	Passed	No Issue

#### SeedToken.sol

SI.	Functions	Туре	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	initialize	write	initializer	No Issue
3	onlyMinter	modifier	Passed	No Issue

4	SideToken_init	internal	initializer	No Issue
5	mint	write	access only Minter	No Issue
6	setMinter	external	access only Owner	No Issue
7	UUPSUpgradableTemplat	internal	initializer	No Issue
	e init			
8	_authorizeUpgrade	internal	access only Owner	No Issue

#### SideToken.sol

#### **Functions**

SI.	Functions	Туре	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	onlyMinter	modifier	Passed	No Issue
3	SideToken_init	internal	initializer	No Issue
4	mint	write	access only Minter	No Issue
5	setMinter	external	Minter contract not	No Issue
			set	

## **BudToken.sol**

SI.	Functions	Type	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	initialize	write	initializer	No Issue
3	UUPSUpgradableTemplat e_init	internal	initializer	No Issue
4	_authorizeUpgrade	internal	access only Owner	No Issue
5	onlyMinter	modifier	Passed	No Issue
6	SideToken init	internal	initializer	No Issue
7	mint	write	access only Minter	No Issue
8	setMinter	external	access only Owner	No Issue

# **Severity Definitions**

Risk Level	Description
Critical	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to token loss etc.
High	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g. public access to crucial
Medium Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to tokens lose	
Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated unused etc. code snippets, that can't have significant impact on execution	
Lowest / Code Style / Best Practice	Lowest-level vulnerabilities, code style violations and info statements can't affect smart contract execution and can be ignored.

## **Audit Findings**

#### **Critical Severity**

No Critical severity vulnerabilities were found.

## **High Severity**

(1) Deposit id override by any depositor: - GamePool.sol

```
/// operam depositId the (d of the deposit based on User.lastDepositId
/// operam user the address of the user
function depositFT(
    uint8 tokenType,
    uint256 amount,
    uint64 depositId,
    address user
) internal {
    Deposit memory deposit = Deposit({tokenType: tokenType, amount: amount, depositedAt: depositsById[depositId] = DepositInfo({index: uint16( users[user].deposits.length), users[user].deposits.push(deposit);
    if (tokenType == SEED) {
        seedToken.transferFrom(user, address(this), amount);
    } else {
        budToken.transferFrom(user, address(this), amount);
    }
    emit NewDeposit(depositId, user, tokenType, amount);
}
```

Functions depositSeed(), depositBud(), depositSeedAndPayOtherUser() are called internal functions ""\_depositFT()".

- Deposited not checked duplicate in \_depositsByld mapping
- DepositId has sequence issue
- "\_depositFT" internal function comment says "depositId the id of the deposit based on User.lastDepositId".

**Resolution**: Deposited should be auto incremented or check duplicate deposited from mapping "\_depositsByld".

Status: This issue is fixed in the revised contract code.

#### Medium

No Medium severity vulnerabilities were found.

#### Low

(1) Compile time error: SuperpowerNFTBase.sol

```
Typeston to the law of the design and the law of months and the law of months and the law of the law of months and law of the law of months and law of the law of months and law of the law
```

```
Summing the property of the pr
```

```
Type from the formulation of the first property of the first prope
```

Function has override specified but does not override anything.

**Resolution:** Add uint256 4th function parameter to avoid this error.

Status: This issue is acknowledged in the revision of the contract code.

(2) Critical operation lacks event log: - GamePool.sol

Missing event log for:

- stakeAsset()
- unstakeAsset()

**Resolution**: Please write an event log for listed events.

Status: This issue is fixed in the revised contract code.

### **Very Low / Informational / Best practices:**

(1) Unused Events, Errors, modifier, mappings:

#### Events are defined but not used in code.

#### NftFactory.sol

- FactorySetFor
- FactoryRemovedFor

#### Errors are defined but not used in code.

#### NftFactory.sol

- NotAFactoryForThisNFT
- FactoryNotFound
- InsufficientPayment

#### SuperpowerNFT.sol

- NotEnoughWLSlots
- InvalidDeadline
- WhitelistNotSetYet

#### SuperpowerNFTBase.sol

- AlreadyInitiated
- NotTheAssetOwner

#### **GamePool.sol**

onlyOnTestnet

#### A modifier is defined but not used.

#### SuperpowerNFTBase.sol

onlyGame()

#### A Mappings is defined but not used.

#### **GamePool.sol**

\_stakedByTokenId

**Resolution:** We suggest removing unused events, modifiers, mappings and errors.

Status: This issue is fixed in the revised contract code.

#### (2) Infinite loops possibility:

#### NftFactory.sol: newSale()

As array elements will increase, then it will cost more and more gas. And eventually, it will stop all the functionality. After several hundreds of transactions, all those functions depending on it will stop. We suggest avoiding loops. For example, use mapping to store the array index. And query that data directly, instead of looping through all the elements to find an element.

**Resolution:** Adjust logic to replace loops with mapping or other code structure.

#### **NftFactory.sol**

newSale() - acceptedTokens.length

#### WhitelistSlot.sol

mintMany() - ids.length

Status: This issue is acknowledged in the contract code.

(3) Minter contract not set: - GamePool.sol

There is a SideToken contract checking whether the minter is a Contract or not in the setMinter() function, so the minter contract is not in scope.

**Resolution**: A minter contract is not provided, if you provide a minter contract in the future, make sure this contract is fully secure.

Status: This issue is acknowledged in the contract code.

(4) Locker contract not set: - GamePool.sol

There is a TurfToken contract checking whether the locker is a Contract or not in the setLocker() function, so the Locker contract is not in scope.

This function is defined in this file - contracts/SuperpowerNFTBase.sol.

**Resolution**: A locker contract is not provided, if you set a locker contract in the future, make sure this contract is fully secure.

Status: This issue is acknowledged in the contract code.

## Centralization

This smart contract has some functions which can be executed by the Admin (Owner) only. If the admin wallet private key would be compromised, then it would create trouble. Following are Admin functions:

#### **NftFactory.sol**

- setWl: Owner can set a whitelist address.
- setPaymentToken: Owner can set, activate or deactivate a payment token address.
- setNewNft: Owner can set a new NFT for sale.
- removeNewNft: Owner can remove an NFT from the sale.
- newSalet: Owner can create a new Sale for an NFT.
- updateSale: Owner can update an existing Sale.
- endSale: Owner can end (removes) an existing Sale.
- updatePrice: Owner can update the prices of an existing running Sale.
- withdrawProceeds: Owner can Withdraw the proceeds.

#### SuperpowerNFT.sol

- setDefaultPlayer: Owner can set the default player address.
- setMaxSupply: Owner can set the maximum supply.
- setFactory: Owner can set the factory address.
- mint: Owner can mint an amount.
- endMinting: Owner can handle end minting.

#### SuperpowerNFTBase.sol

- preInitializeAttributesFor: Owner can pre initialized attributes.
- updateTokenURI: Owner can update the token URI.
- freezeTokenURI: Owner can freeze the token URI.
- setGame: Owner can set the game address.
- setLocker: Owner can set the locker address.
- removeLocker: Owner can remove the locker address.
- unlocklfRemovedLocker: Owner can emergency unlock in case a compromised locker is removed.

#### WhitelistSlot.sol

setURI: Owner can set a new URI.

#### Farm.sol

- setBurner: Owner can set a new burner address.
- mintBatch: Owner can mint the Batch addresses.
- mintMany: Owner can mint the many addresses.

#### Wormhole Tunnel.sol

- wormholeInit: Owner can wormhole initialize.
- wormholeRegisterContract: Owner can set a wormhole register contract address.

#### Signable.sol

setValidator: Owner can set a signable validator address.

#### GamePool.sol

- setConf: Owner can set burning points .
- withdrawFT: Owner can withdraw an amount of funds in SEEDS or BUDS, or all of them if amount is 0.
- initializeTurf: Owner can initialize the attributes of a turf token.
- initializeFarm: Owner can initialize the attributes of a farm.

#### SideToken.sol

setMinter: Owner can set a minter address.

To make the smart contract 100% decentralized, we suggest renouncing ownership in the airdrop smart contract once its function is completed.

Conclusion

We were given a contract code in the form of a github link. And we have used all possible

tests based on given objects as files. We had observed 1 high severity issue, 2 low

severity issues and some Informational severity issues in the smart contracts. All issues

have been fixed / acknowledged in the code. So, the smart contracts are ready for the

mainnet deployment.

Since possible test cases can be unlimited for such smart contracts protocol, we provide

no such guarantee of future outcomes. We have used all the latest static tools and manual

observations to cover maximum possible test cases to scan everything.

Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static

analysis tools. Smart Contract's high-level description of functionality was presented in the

As-is overview section of the report.

Audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed

code.

Security state of the reviewed contract, based on standard audit procedure scope, is

"Secured".

**Our Methodology** 

We like to work with a transparent process and make our reviews a collaborative effort.

The goals of our security audits are to improve the quality of systems we review and aim

for sufficient remediation to help protect users. The following is the methodology we use in

our security audit process.

Manual Code Review:

In manually reviewing all of the code, we look for any potential issues with code logic, error

handling, protocol and header parsing, cryptographic errors, and random number

generators. We also watch for areas where more defensive programming could reduce the

risk of future mistakes and speed up future audits. Although our primary focus is on the

in-scope code, we examine dependency code and behavior when it is relevant to a

particular line of investigation.

**Vulnerability Analysis:** 

Our audit techniques included manual code analysis, user interface interaction, and

whitebox penetration testing. We look at the project's web site to get a high level

understanding of what functionality the software under review provides. We then meet with

the developers to gain an appreciation of their vision of the software. We install and use

the relevant software, exploring the user interactions and roles. While we do this, we

brainstorm threat models and attack surfaces. We read design documentation, review

other audit results, search for similar projects, examine source code dependencies, skim

open issue tickets, and generally investigate details other than the implementation.

#### **Documenting Results:**

We follow a conservative, transparent process for analyzing potential security vulnerabilities and seeing them through successful remediation. Whenever a potential issue is discovered, we immediately create an Issue entry for it in this document, even though we have not yet verified the feasibility and impact of the issue. This process is conservative because we document our suspicions early even if they are later shown to not represent exploitable vulnerabilities. We generally follow a process of first documenting the suspicion with unresolved questions, then confirming the issue through code analysis, live experimentation, or automated tests. Code analysis is the most tentative, and we strive to provide test code, log captures, or screenshots demonstrating our confirmation. After this we analyze the feasibility of an attack in a live system.

#### Suggested Solutions:

We search for immediate mitigations that live deployments can take, and finally we suggest the requirements for remediation engineering for future releases. The mitigation and remediation recommendations should be scrutinized by the developers and deployment engineers, and successful mitigation and remediation is an ongoing collaborative process after we deliver our report, and before the details are made public.

## **Disclaimers**

## **EtherAuthority.io Disclaimer**

EtherAuthority team has analyzed this smart contract in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment and functionality (performing the intended functions).

Due to the fact that the total number of test cases are unlimited, the audit makes no statements or warranties on security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bugfree status or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only. We also suggest conducting a bug bounty program to confirm the high level of security of this smart contract.

#### **Technical Disclaimer**

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on the blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have their own vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee explicit security of the audited smart contracts.

# **Appendix**


# **Code Flow Diagram - Mobland**

# **NftFactory Diagram**




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# SuperpowerNFT Diagram




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# SuperpowerNFTBase Diagram




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# WhitelistSlot Diagram




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# Farm Diagram




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# **FarmBridged Diagram**




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# **Turf Diagram**




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# **TurfBridged Diagram**




This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.


# Wormhole721 Diagram




# **WormholeCommon Diagram**



# **WormholeTunnel Diagram**




# **GamePool Diagram**




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# Signable Diagram




# SignableStakes Diagram




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# SideToken Diagram




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# **BudToken Diagram**



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# SeedToken Diagram



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# Slither Results Log

# Slither log >> NftFactory.sol

```
Dangerous comparisons:
- isWl = block.timestamp < soles[nft]d].whitelisUntil (NftFactory sol#3461)
ieference: https://github.com/crytic/alither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
  Tariable SuperpowerNFT. pintEnded (NftFactory.iol#3132) is not in miseMise
Smittles SideToken. _SideToken_unit(string.string) (NftFactory.sel#3245-3248) is not in mixedEase
Pariable SideToken. _gap (NftFactory.sel#3250) is not in mixedEase
Pefernce: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wik:/Detector.Documentation#conformance-to-selidity-naming-conventions
 ERC20, decimals (MftFactory.sol#1384) should be immutable
ERC20, name (MftFactory.sol#1382) should be immutable
ERC20, symbol (MftFactory.sol#1383) should be immutable
ERC20, symbol (MftFactory.sol#1383) should be immutable
ERG40; bttps://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declares-immutable
MftFactory.sol analyzed [57 contracts with 84 detectors], 272 result[s] found
```

# Slither log >> SuperpowerNFT.sol

```
__macSupply = macSupply__(SuperpowerMFT_tole7000)
rence - https://github.com/crytic/ilither/wiki/Detectur-Bocomentation@micaing-eventa-arithmetic
  Parameter SuperpowerNFTBase attributesOf(uint256,address.uint256). Ld [SuperpowerNFT.sol#1831] is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNFTBase attributesOf(uint256,address.uint256]. player [SuperpowerNFT.sol#1832] is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNFTBase attributesOf(uint256,address.uint256]. player [SuperpowerNFT.sol#1832] is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNFTBase updateAttributes(uint256,uint256.uint256]. In [SuperpowerNFT.sol#1843] is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNFTBase updateAttributes(uint256,uint256.uint256]. index [SuperpowerNFT.sol#1843] is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNFTBase updateAttributes(uint256,uint256). pthributes (SuperpowerNFT.sol#1843) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNFTBase.updateAttributes(uint256,uint256). pthributes (SuperpowerNFT.sol#1843) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNFTBase.updateAttributes (SuperpowerNFT.sol#1777) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNFT unatTokenid (SuperpowerNFT.sol#1878) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNFT unatEnded (SuperpowerNFT.sol#1878) is not in mixedCase
```

# Slither log >> SuperpowerNFTBase.sol

```
erpowerNFTEass setSame(address) game_(SuperpowerNFTEase asl#1855) locks a zero-check on :
```

# Slither log >> WhitelistSlot.sol

```
Orages variant(0.0.4 (WhitelistSlot.sol#3) allows old variant
sold-0.3.4 is not recembeded for deployment
neforence: https://github.com/c/y/c/slither/wiki/Detector-bocumentation#incor/ect-versions-of-selidity

whitelistBlot (WhitelistSlot.sol#2880-2682) should inferrit from JahitelistSlot (WhitelistSlot.sol#7-27)
Reference: https://github.com/c/yic/slither/wiki/Detector-bocumentation#incor/ect-versions-of-selidity

Parameter SuperpowerWFIBsoc.attributesOf(wint256.sodress.wint256) _ id (WhitelistSlot.sol#2807) is not in mixedCase

Parameter SuperpowerWFIBsoc.attributesOf(wint256.sodress.wint256) _ id (WhitelistSlot.sol#2807) is not in mixedCase

Parameter SuperpowerWFIBsoc.attributesOf(wint256.sodress.wint256) _ id (WhitelistSlot.sol#2807) is not in mixedCase

Parameter SuperpowerWFIBsoc.apdateAttributes(wint256.wint256.wint256) _ id (WhitelistSlot.sol#2802) is not in mixedCase

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Parameter SuperpowerWFIBsoc.apdateAttributes(wint256.wint256.wint256) _ id (WhitelistSlot.sol#2802) is not in mixedCase

Parameter SuperpowerWFIBsoc.apdateAttributes(wint256.wint256.wint256) _ id (WhitelistSlot.sol#2802) is not in mixedCase

Parameter SuperpowerWFIBsoc.apdateAttributes(wint256.wint256.wint256) _ id (WhitelistSlot.sol#2802) is not in mixedCase

Variable SuperpowerWFIBsoc.apdateAttributes(wint256.sol#2802) is not in mixedCase

Variable SuperpowerWFI _ maxSupply (WhitelistSlot.sol#2802) is not in mixedCase

Variable SuperpowerWFI _ mintendud (WhitelistSlot.sol#2802) is not in mixedCase

Variable SuperpowerWFI _ mintendud (WhitelistSlot.sol#2802) is not in mixedCase

Variable SuperpowerWFI _ mintendud (WhitelistSlot.sol#2802) is not in mixedCase

Variable SuperpowerWFI _ mintendud (WhitelistSlot.sol#2802) is not in mixedCase

Variable SuperpowerWFI _ mintendud (WhitelistSlot.sol#2802) is not in mixedCase

Variable SuperpowerWFI _ mintendud (WhitelistSlot.sol#2802) is not in mixedCase

Variable SuperpowerWF
```

# Slither log >> Farm.sol

```
Program versionS.8.4 (Form.solW3) allows old versions
solc-0.8.4 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytu//illhe/viki/Detector-Ducumentation#incurrect-versions-of-solujity

Parameter SuperpowerhFIBase.pruInitalizeAttributesFor(uint256.uint256).id (Form.sol#1797) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerhFIBase.stributesBfuint256.address_uint256].id (Form.sol#1897) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerhFIBase.attributesBfuint256.address_uint256].id (Form.sol#1897) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerhFIBase.attributesBfuint256.address_uint256].player (Form.sol#1897) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerhFIBase.attributesBfuint256.address_uint256].idex (Form.sol#1897) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerhFIBase.updateAttributes[uint256.uint256.uint256].idex (Form.sol#1898) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerhFIBase.updateAttributes[uint256.uint256.uint256].idex (Form.sol#1899) is not in mixedCase
Variable SuperpowerhFIBase.topdateAttributes[uint256.uint256.uint256].idex (Form.sol#1890) is not in mixedCase
Variable SuperpowerhFIBase.topdateAttributes[uint256.uint256.uint256].attributes (Form.sol#1820) is not in mixedCase
Variable SuperpowerhFIBase.topdateAttributes[uint256.uint256].attributes (Form.sol#1820) is not in mixedCase
Variable SuperpowerhFIBase.topdateAttributes[uint256.uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[uint256].attributes[u
```

### Slither log >> FarmBridged.sol

# Slither log >> Turf.sol

```
SuperpowerNET.mint(address_uint256) (Turf_solw2057-2063) has costly operations invide a logs __istetUntite_nextTaken3d +1) (Turf_solw2059)
Reference https://github.com/crytic/Hither/wik/Detector-Decumentation#costly-operations-invide a logs
Function ERC72:EnumensableUpgraduable. ERC72:Enumensable init() (Turf_solw1659-1668) is not in mixedCase
Function ERC72:EnumensableUpgraduable. ERC72:Enumensable init() (Turf_solw1659-1668) is not in mixedCase
Function ERC72:EnumensableUpgraduable. Gaps (Turf_solw1659) is not in mixedCase
Function SuperpowerNETBase. SuperpowerNETBase init(sint) (Turf_solw1658) id (Turf_solw1827) is not in mixedCase
Function SuperpowerNETBase.preInit(solw1658)
Parameter SuperpowerNETBase.preInit(solw1658)
Parameter SuperpowerNETBase.preInit(solw1658)
Parameter SuperpowerNETBase.attr(butsesfor(unt256,address_unt1256)). Id (Turf_solw1827) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNETBase.attr(butsesfor(unt256,address_unt1256)). Id (Turf_solw1837) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNETBase.attr(butsesfor(unt256,address_unt1256)). Id (Turf_solw1837) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNETBase.updateAttr(butsesfor(unt256,unt256)). Id (Turf_solw1837) is not in mixedCase
Parameter SuperpowerNETBase.updateAttr(butsesfunt256,unt256,unt256). Id (Turf_solw1849) is not in mixedCase
Variable SuperpowerNETBase.gap(furf_solw1849) is not in mixedCase
Variable
```

# Slither log >> TurfBridged.sol

# Slither log >> Wormhole721.sol

```
Program servicents 3.4 (Wormhole 221. solz 2) allows old versions
soli-3.5.8 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Sociaentation#Invorract-versions-of-solidity

Parameter SytesLib.toUint 256 hytes.uint 256) Thytes (Wormhole 721. solz 259) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.toUint 256 hytes.uint 256) that (Wormhole 721. solz 259) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.toUint 256 hytes.uint 256) that (Wormhole 721. solz 270) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.toUpuel bytes.uint 256) that (Wormhole 721. solz 270) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal bytes.bytes). preSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 270) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal bytes.bytes). postSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes, bytes). postSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes, bytes). postSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes, bytes). postSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes, bytes). postSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes, bytes). postSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes, bytes). postSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes, bytes). postSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes.bytes). postSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes.bytes). postSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes.bytes). postSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes.bytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes.bytes). postSytes (Wormhole 721. solz 281) is not in mixed ase
Farameter SytesLib.equal storage bytes.by
```

# Slither log >> WormholeCommon.sol

```
Pragma version/8.8.4 (WormholeCommon.sol#2) allows old versions
solr-0.8.4 is not recommended for deployment
reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Decimentation#incorrect-versions-of-selidity

Farameter BytesLib toBytes32(bytes_uint256) [bytes | WormholeCommon.sol#268) is not in mixedCome
Farameter BytesLib.equal(bytes.bytes) _proBytes (WormholeCommon.sol#279) is not in mixedCome
Farameter BytesLib.equal(bytes.bytes) _postBytes (WormholeCommon.sol#272) is not in mixedCome
Farameter BytesLib.equal(bytes.bytes) _postBytes _postByte
```

# Slither log >> WormholeTunnel.sol

```
Morabolationnel.woreholeinitiunniid, journaloitumel.pole903-903 (function)

Morabolationnel.woreholeinitiunniid, journaloitumel.pole903-903 (function)

Morabolationnel.woreholeinitiunniid, publiss, journaloit journaloit journaloitumel.col2903) shadows:

Journaloitumel.woreholeitionniidiment.publiss (journaloitumel.col2903) shadows:

Journaloitumel.woreholeitionniidiment.publiss (journaloitumel.col2903)

Morabolationel.woreholeitionniidiment.publiss (journaloitumel.col2903)

Morabolationel.woreholeitionniidiment.journaloitumel.col2903-903 (journaloitumel.col2903)

Morabolationel.woreholeitionniidiment.gournaloitumel.col2903-903 (journaloitumel.col2903-903)

Morabolationel.woreholeitimel.col2903-903 (journaloitumel.gol2903-204)

Morabolationel.gournaloitumel.col2903-903 (journaloitumel.gol2903-204)

Morabolationel.gournaloitumel.gol2903-903 (journaloitumel.gol2903-204)

Morabolationel.gournaloitumel.gol2903-903 (journaloitumel.gol2903-204)

Morabolationel.gournaloitumel.gol2903-903 (journaloitumel.gol2903-903)

Morabolationel.gournaloitumel.gol2903-903 (journaloitumel.gol2903-903)

Morabolationel.gournaloitumel.gol2903-903 (journaloitumel.gol3903-903)

Morabolationel.gournaloitumel.gol2903 (journaloitumel.gol3903-903)

Morabolationel.gournaloitumel.gol3903-903 (journaloitumel.gol3903-903)

Morabolationel.gournaloitumel.gol3903-903 (journaloitumel.gol3903)

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```

# Slither log >> GamePool.sol

# Slither log >> Signable.sol

```
Program versionU.S.4 (Signable enl#2) allows old versions
solt-0.5.4 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Socumentation#Incorrect-versions-of-solidity
```

# Slither log >> SignableStakes.sol

# Slither log >> SideToken.sol

# Slither log >> BudToken.sol

```
Function ERC1907upgradeupprodeable _ERC1907upgrade_unit() (AudToken mol#200-201) us not un mixedCase
Function ERC1907upgradeupprodeable _ERC1907upgrade_unit_unchanned() (BudToken sol#20-204) in not un mixedCase
Function UPSUpgradeuple _UPSUpgradeuple _Urit() (BudToken sol#30-311) is not un mixedCase
Function UPSUpgradeuple _UPSUpgradeuple _Urit() (BudToken sol#30-311) is not un mixedCase
Function UPSUpgradeuple _UPSUpgradeuple _Urit() (BudToken sol#30-311) is not un mixedCase
Variable uPSUpgradeuple _Self (BudToken sol#315) is not un mixedCase
Variable uPSUpgradeuple _gap (BudToken mol#30-315) is not un mixedCase
Function ContextUpgradeuple _Context initi) (BudToken mol#30-350) is not un mixedCase
Function ContextUpgradeuple _Context initi unchained() (BudToken mol#35-350) is not in mixedCase
Function ContextUpgradeuple _Context initi unchained() (BudToken mol#35-350) is not in mixedCase
Function Davideupgradeuple _Goneble _init unchained() (BudToken mol#31-370) is not in mixedCase
Function Davideupgradeuple _Goneble _init unchained() (BudToken mol#31-370) is not in mixedCase
Function UPSUpgradeuple _Goneble _init unchained() (BudToken mol#31-371) is not in mixedCase
Function UPSUpgradeuple _Goneble _init unchained() (BudToken mol#31-371) is not in mixedCase
Function UPSUpgradeuple _Goneble _Goneble _init unchained()
Function UPSUpgradeuple _Goneble _Goneble
```

# Slither log >> SeedToken.sol

```
Progras version 0.8.4 (seedicken.sola2) allows old versions solc 0.8.4 is not recommended for deployment. 
Reference: https://github.tom/cryttk/slither.wiki/letectur-Gocumentation#lecorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level tall in AddressUpgradeable.seedValue(address.joint256) [SeedIcken.sol#01-50);
    (success) = recipient.colivaturi amount[] [SeedIcken.sol#01]

Low level tall in AddressUpgradeable.function(allwithValue) address bytes.joint256, string) (SeedIcken.sol#08-97);
    (success, returndata) = target.colivaturi amount[] [SeedIcken.sol#05]

Low level tall in AddressUpgradeable.functionStaticall(address.bytes.joint) [SeedIcken.sol#05]

Low level tall in AddressUpgradeable.functionStaticall(address.bytes.joint) [SeedIcken.sol#05]

Low level tall in Exciso/upgradeable.functionStaticall(address.bytes.joint) [SeedIcken.sol#05]

Low level tall in Exciso/upgradeable.functionStaticall(address.bytes.joint) [SeedIcken.sol#293-301];
    (SeedIcken.sol#05) [SeedIcken.sol#06]

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/detector-bocumentationStation-sol#06]

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/detector-bocumentationStation
```

# **Solidity Static Analysis**

# NftFactory.sol

# Security

# Block timestamp:

Use of "block.timestamp": "block.timestamp" can be influenced by miners to a certain degree. That means that a miner can "choose" the block.timestamp, to a certain degree, to change the outcome of a transaction in the mined block.

more

Pos: 3571:16:

# Gas & Economy

# For loop over dynamic array:

Loops that do not have a fixed number of iterations, for example, loops that depend on storage values, have to be used carefully. Due to the block gas limit, transactions can only consume a certain amount of gas. The number of iterations in a loop can grow beyond the block gas limit which can cause the complete contract to be stalled at a certain point. Additionally, using unbounded loops incurs in a lot of avoidable gas costs. Carefully test how many items at maximum you can pass to such functions to make it successful.

more

Pos. 3446;4:

### ERC

### ERC20:

ERC20 contract's "decimals" function should have "uint8" as return type

more

Pos: 200:4:

# Miscellaneous

#### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 3255:4:

# SuperpowerNFT.sol

### Security

### Low level calls:

Use of "delegatecall": should be avoided whenever possible. External code, that is called can change the state of the calling contract and send ether from the caller's balance. If this is wanted behaviour, use the Solidity library feature if possible.

more

Pos. 1415:50:

# Gas & Economy

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function SuperpowerNFT endMinting is infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid toops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos. 2058.2:

### Miscellaneous:

# Delete from dynamic array:

Using "delete" on an array leaves a gap. The length of the array remains the same. If you want to remove the empty position you need to shift items manually and update the "length" property.

Pos. 1954.4.

# SuperpowerNFTBase.sol

# Security

### Low level calls:

Use of "delegatecall": should be avoided whenever possible. External code, that is called can change the state of the calling contract and send ether from the caller's balance. If this is wanted behaviour, use the Solidity library feature if possible.

more

Pos. 1395:50:

### Gas & Economy

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function Wormhole721Upgradeable wormholeTransfer is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos. 1925:2

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# Miscellaneous

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos. 1649:8

# Delete from dynamic array:

Using "delete" on an array leaves a gap. The length of the array remains the same. If you want to remove the empty position you need to shift items manually and update the "length" property.

Pos 1919 4

### WhitelistSlot.sol

# Security

### Low level calls:

Use of "delegatecall": should be avoided whenever possible. External code, that is called can change the state of the calling contract and send ether from the caller's balance. If this is wanted behaviour, use the Solidity library feature if possible.

more

Pos. 1415:50:

# Gas & Economy

#### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function WhitelistSlot safeTransferFrom is infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos. 117.4

#### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function WhitelistSlot.mintMany is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage).

Pos: 43:2:

# Miscellaneous

This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos. 1685.B.

# Delete from dynamic array:

Using "delete" on an array leaves a gap. The length of the array remains the same. If you want to remove the empty position you need to shift items manually and update the "length" property.

Pos: 1082.8.

### Farm.sol

# Security

# Inline assembly:

The Contract uses inline assembly, this is only advised in rare cases. Additionally static analysis modules do not parse inline Assembly, this can lead to wrong analysis results.

more

Pos: 1151:20:

### Gas & Economy

#### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function Farm initialize is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 11:2

### Miscellaneous

# Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos. 1685.8:

# FarmBridged.sol

# Security

# Inline assembly:

The Contract uses inline assembly, this is only advised in rare cases. Additionally static analysis modules do not parse inline Assembly, this can lead to wrong analysis results.

Pos 1292 8

# Gas & Economy

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function FarmBridged unlockIfRemovedLocker is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos 1921 2

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function FarmBridged initialize is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 1949:2:

## Miscellaneous

# Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos. 1234.4.

# Delete from dynamic array:

Using "delete" on an array leaves a gap. The length of the array remains the same. If you want to remove the empty position you need to shift items manually and update the "length" property.

Pos 1917:4

#### Turf.sol

# Security

### Low level calls:

Use of "delegatecall": should be avoided whenever possible. External code, that is called can change the state of the calling contract and send ether from the caller's balance. If this is wanted behaviour, use the Solidity library feature if possible.

more

Pos. 1432 50.

# Gas & Economy

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function Turf attributesOf is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage). Pos. 1835:2.

# Miscellaneous

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos. 1686:8:

### TurfBridged.sol

### Security

### Inline assembly:

The Contract uses inline assembly, this is only advised in rare cases. Additionally static analysis modules do not parse inline Assembly, this can lead to wrong analysis results.

more

Pos. 12818

# Gas & Economy

#### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function TurfBridged initialize is infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage) Pos: 10:2:

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# Miscellaneous

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 1463:8:

### Wormhole721.sol

# Security

# Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in Address\_functionCallWithValue(address\_bytes,uint256,string): Could potentially lead to reentrancy vulnerability. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

Pos. 715:4

# Gas & Economy

#### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function Wormhole721 wormholeCompleteTransfer is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos. 1202.2

### Miscellaneous

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 1197:4:

# Delete from dynamic array:

Using "delete" on an array leaves a gap. The length of the array remains the same. If you want to remove the empty position you need to shift items manually and update the "length" property.

Pos. 1052.8.

### WormholeCommon.sol

# Security

### Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in

WormholeCommon.\_wormholeCompleteTransfer(bytes). Could potentially lead to re-entrancy vulnerability.

more

Pos: 495:2:

# Miscellaneous

# Similar variable names:

WormholeCommon\_wormholeCompleteTransfer(bytes): Variables have very similar names "vm" and "to".

Pos. 502.48.

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos. 563:4:

### WormholeTunnel.sol

# Security

### Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in

WormholeCommon\_wormholeCompleteTransfer(bytes): Could potentially lead to re-entrancy vulnerability. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos: 511:2:

### Miscellaneous

### Constant/View/Pure functions:

Wormhole Tunnet getInterfaceId(): Is constant but potentially should not be. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos 691-2

#### GamePool.sol

# Security

# Block timestamp:

Use of "block.timestamp": "block.timestamp" can be influenced by miners to a certain degree. That means that a miner can "choose" the block.timestamp, to a certain degree, to change the outcome of a transaction in the mined block.

Pos: 1568:23:

# Gas & Economy

# Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function GamePool.getUserStakes is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 1405:5:

# Miscellaneous

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 1131-7:

### Data truncated:

Division of integer values yields an integer value again. That means e.g. 10 / 100 = 0 instead of 0.1 since the result is an integer again. This does not hold for division of (only) literal values since those yield rational constants.

Pos: 102:19:

# Signable.sol

# Security

# Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in

AddressUpgradeable functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string): Could potentially lead to re-entrancy vulnerability. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos: 195:7:

# Gas & Economy

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function Signable setValidator is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)
Pos. 380:5:

### Miscellaneous

### Constant/View/Pure functions:

StringsUpgradeable toString(uint256): Is constant but potentially should not be. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos. 11:4:

# Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos. 381.7:

# SignableStakes.sol

# Security

# Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in

AddressUpgradeable functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string): Could potentially lead to re-entrancy vulnerability. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

resorre

Pos: 195:7:

# Gas & Economy

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function Signable is Validator is infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage). Pos. 390.5:

### Miscellaneous

### Constant/View/Pure functions:

StringsUpgradeable to String (uint 256): Is constant but potentially should not be. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos. 114

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos. 353:11:

### SideToken.sol

### Security

### Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in AddressUpgradeable functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string): Could potentially lead to re-entrancy vulnerability. Note Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos: 67:4:

### Gas & Economy

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function ERC20Upgradeable name is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 290:4:

### Miscellaneous

# Constant/View/Pure functions:

IERC20Upgradeable transfer(address,uint256): Potentially should be constant/view/pure but is not. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos: 14:4:

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos 514.4

### BudToken.sol

# Security

### Low level calls:

Use of "delegatecall": should be avoided whenever possible. External code, that is called can change the state of the calling contract and send ether from the caller's balance. If this is wanted behaviour, use the Solidity library feature if possible.

more

Pos: 303:50

# Gas & Economy

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function BudToken initialize is infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage).

Pos. 705:2

### Miscellaneous

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false; not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false; due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 693:4:

#### SeedToken.sol

# Security

### Low level calls:

Use of "delegatecall": should be avoided whenever possible. External code, that is called can change the state of the calling contract and send ether from the caller's balance. If this is wanted behaviour, use the Solidity library feature if possible.

more

Pos 302 50:

# Gas & Economy

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function SeedToken.initialize is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage). Post 703.2:

# Miscellaneous

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 691 4:

# **Solhint Linter**

# NftFactory.sol

```
NftFactory.sol:3565:64: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
NftFactory.sol:3566:60: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
NftFactory.sol:3567:79: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
NftFactory.sol:3568:99: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
NftFactory.sol:3573:99: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
NftFactory.sol:3576:67: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
NftFactory.sol:3581:106: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
NftFactory.sol:3596:73: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
```

# SuperpowerNFT.sol

```
SuperpowerNFT.sol:2048:26: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
SuperpowerNFT.sol:2064:25: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
SuperpowerNFT.sol:2068:49: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
SuperpowerNFT.sol:2073:49: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
SuperpowerNFT.sol:2081:55: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
SuperpowerNFT.sol:2086:51: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
```

# SuperpowerNFTBase.sol

```
SuperpowerNFTBase.sol:1887:48: Error: Parse error: mismatched input
'(' expecting {';', '='}
SuperpowerNFTBase.sol:1942:24: Error: Parse error: mismatched input
'(' expecting {';', '='}
SuperpowerNFTBase.sol:1950:27: Error: Parse error: mismatched input
'(' expecting {';', '='}
SuperpowerNFTBase.sol:1953:34: Error: Parse error: mismatched input
'(' expecting {';', '='}
SuperpowerNFTBase.sol:1963:24: Error: Parse error: mismatched input
'(' expecting {';', '='}
```

```
SuperpowerNFTBase.sol:1977:34: Error: Parse error: mismatched input
'(' expecting {';', '='}
SuperpowerNFTBase.sol:2000:43: Error: Parse error: mismatched input
'(' expecting {';', '='}
```

### WhitelistSlot.sol

```
WhitelistSlot.sol:13:20: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
WhitelistSlot.sol:14:20: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
WhitelistSlot.sol:15:26: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
WhitelistSlot.sol:30:25: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
WhitelistSlot.sol:48:90: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
WhitelistSlot.sol:60:25: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
WhitelistSlot.sol:60:25: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('expecting {';', '='}
```

### Farm.sol

```
Farm.sol:2:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.17 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
```

### FarmBridged.sol

```
FarmBridged.sol:2:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.17 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
```

#### Turf.sol

```
Turf.sol:2:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.17 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
```

### TurfBridged.sol

```
TurfBridged.sol:2:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.17 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
```

#### Wormhole721.sol

```
Wormhole721.sol:1010:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
Wormhole721.sol:1030:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
Wormhole721.sol:1054:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
```

### WormholeCommon.sol

```
WormholeCommon.sol:272:5: Error: Avoid using inline assembly. It is acceptable only in rare cases
WormholeCommon.sol:282:5: Error: Avoid using inline assembly. It is acceptable only in rare cases
WormholeCommon.sol:315:5: Error: Avoid using inline assembly. It is acceptable only in rare cases
WormholeCommon.sol:340:17: Error: Code contains empty blocks
WormholeCommon.sol:461:3: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state
```

### WormholeTunnel.sol

```
WormholeTunnel.sol:340:17: Error: Code contains empty blocks
WormholeTunnel.sol:477:3: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state
WormholeTunnel.sol:587:75: Error: Code contains empty blocks
WormholeTunnel.sol:602:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in
function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
WormholeTunnel.sol:641:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in
function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
```

### GamePool.sol

```
GamePool.sol:1605:51: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
GamePool.sol:1646:36: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
GamePool.sol:1648:38: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
GamePool.sol:1690:36: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
GamePool.sol:1692:38: Error: Parse error: mismatched input '('
expecting {';', '='}
```

### Signable.sol

```
Signable.sol:2:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.17 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
```

```
Signable.sol:90:13: Error: Avoid using inline assembly. It is acceptable only in rare cases
Signable.sol:327:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase
Signable.sol:331:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase
```

# SignableStakes.sol

```
SignableStakes.sol:310:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase SignableStakes.sol:310:67: Error: Code contains empty blocks SignableStakes.sol:327:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase SignableStakes.sol:331:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase
```

#### SideToken.sol

```
SideToken.sol:347:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
SideToken.sol:366:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
SideToken.sol:382:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
SideToken.sol:397:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
SideToken.sol:427:22: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
```

### BudToken.sol

```
BudToken.sol:526:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
BudToken.sol:545:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
BudToken.sol:561:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
BudToken.sol:576:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
BudToken.sol:606:22: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
```

### SeedToken.sol

```
SeedToken.sol:524:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
SeedToken.sol:543:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
SeedToken.sol:559:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
SeedToken.sol:574:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
SeedToken.sol:604:22: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
```

### Software analysis result:

These software reported many false positive results and some are informational issues. So, those issues can be safely ignored.



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